We examine whether agency problems between shareholders and managers can be alleviated through the ability of a large shareholder to sell shares based on private information. We show that a shareholder's threat of exit can have a disciplinary impact, but whether and how effectively this mechanism works can depend critically on the information structure and on whether the agency problem involves motivating the manager to take a desirable action or discouraging him from taking an undesirable action. For example, if managerial action is publicly observable, then in our model the threat of exit on the basis of private information lowers the incidence of value-reducing actions, but weakens managerial incentives to take value-enhancing actions.
Introduction
The role of active large shareholders in improving corporate performance has been discussed extensively in the last two decades. Although collectively institutional investors such as pension funds and mutual funds hold a substantial and increasing fraction of shares in public companies in the U.S., these large shareholders typically play a limited role in overt forms of shareholder activism such as takeovers, proxy fights, strategic voting, shareholders' proposals, etc. One possible reason for this is that many forms of shareholder activism are costly to active shareholders, and these shareholders arguably realize a relatively small fraction of the benefits. In other words, we have the classic "free rider" problem. In addition to this, agency problems affecting the incentives of the large shareholder, legal barriers, and the fact that many large shareholders, particularly mutual funds, are committed through their charters not to invest resources to monitor their portfolio firms, have also worked to limit activism.
1 If a large shareholder is aware that a firm's management does not act in the best interest of shareholders, it may be rational for the shareholder to follow the so-called "Wall Street Rule" or "Wall Street Walk," which leads the shareholder to sell his shares (i.e., "vote with his feet") rather than attempt to be active.
Since the Wall Street Walk seems to be an alternative to activism, it appears to be inconsistent with it. This has led some (see, e.g., Bhide (1993) and Coffee (1993) ) to argue that market liquidity that allows potentially active shareholders to exit and therefore not engage in monitoring and governance activities impairs corporate governance. What seems to have not been widely recognized is the possibility that the Wall Street Walk itself can be a form of shareholder activism. One exception is Palmiter (2002 Palmiter ( , p. 1437 , who suggests that large shareholders may be able to affect managerial decisions through the "threat (actual or implied) of selling their holdings and driving down the price of the targeted company." If managers' compensation is tied to share prices, and if the exit of a large shareholder has a negative price impact, then the presence of a large shareholder who is potentially able to trade on private information may help discipline management and improve corporate governance. This form of monitoring is consistent with behind-the-scenes negotiation with management or 'jawboning' activities, which are often considered an alternative to more costly control mechanisms and which seem to be common and often successful in affecting managerial decisions.
Note that it is not clear a priori whether and how the ability of a large shareholder to exit might work to alleviate agency problems between managers and shareholders. First, since exit by a large shareholder is assumed to drive down the price of the targeted firm, it would appear that the large shareholder loses when he carries out such a threat to exit. This leads one to question 1 There are many papers in the law and economics literature on the role of large shareholders in corporate governance and on shareholder activism. With each of them taking a somewhat unique point of view on the subject, Bainbridge (2005) , Bebchuk (2005) , Black (1990) , Black and Coffee (1994) , Gillan and Starks (1998) , Grundfest (1993) Macey (1997) , Palmiter (2002) , Roe (1994) and Romano (1993 Romano ( , 2001 ) discuss how shareholder activism has been practiced, describe some of the barriers that have limited its use and effectiveness, and suggest ways that large shareholders can become more involved in corporate governance.
whether the threat is credible. Second, even if the threat is credible, it is not clear that the threat will always work to benefit other existing shareholders. Third, it is not clear whether the threat of exit continues to work when in addition to the price impact created by the large shareholder's exit, the large shareholder incurs other costs of carrying out the threat such as transactions costs. Finally, it is not clear that exit by the large shareholder benefits the remaining shareholders if the large shareholder's exit means the loss of future monitoring benefits that would accrue if the large shareholder did not exit.
In this paper we examine all of these issues within a model where a firm's manager has incentives that are not aligned with shareholders. We assume that a large shareholder has private information about the manager's actions and/or the consequences of these actions to the value of the firm, and that he can sell his shares (exit) based on this information. In our model all agents are rational and prices perfectly reflect all public information, including the large shareholder's trading decisions. Our model combines two common elements present in trading models and in models of executive compensation, namely that (i) large shareholders have incentives to collect information and use it for trading and (ii) explicit and implicit managerial compensation contracts generally lead managers to be sensitive to market prices of their firm. The resulting disciplinary impact of large shareholder exit potentially explains some of the observed interaction between large shareholders and managers.
Our analysis examines two distinct types of agency problems. In one case, the manager can take an action that is undesirable (value-reducing or "bad") from shareholders' perspective, but which produces a private benefit to the manager. In the other case, the action is desirable (valueenhancing or "good") from shareholders' perspective, but it is privately costly to the manager.
2
Mature firms with large cash reserves (Free Cash Flow) may be more prone to a the first type of agency problem while the second type of agency problem may arise when profitable projects entail high cost to the manager in effort or through the risk of failure and job loss. The large shareholder in our model observes some information privately before other investors, and may be able to trade on the basis of this information. For each of the agency problems and for a number of different information structures, we examine how the presence of the privately-informed large shareholder affects the agency costs associated with the action.
While the two types of agency problems described above may seem to be mirror images of one another, it turns out that they can lead to dramatically different results with respect to the disciplinary impact of the large shareholder. This is most striking when all investors observe whether the action was taken and the large shareholder has private information regarding the consequences of the action. In this case we show that the threat of sale by the large shareholder increases, at the margin, the punishment to the manager for taking a bad action but decreases the reward for taking a good action relative to the benchmark case where the large shareholder is not present. Thus, the presence of the large shareholder leads to a reduction in the agency costs associated with a value-reducing action but to an increase in the agency costs associated with a value-enhancing action.
We also examine how potential exit may affect the agency problem when exit has consequences beyond the price impact that is due to its informational content. For example, there may be transaction costs borne by the large shareholder when she trades, or there may be a further reduction in the value of the firm due to the loss of future monitoring benefits. The latter cost is different from a transactions cost, since it is borne by all shareholders and affects managerial compensation in our model. We show that even in the presence of these exit costs, the threat of exit can be credible, and it can reduce the agency costs. In fact, the large shareholder may be more effective in disciplining the manager if exit reduces the subsequent total value of the firm, because in this case exit inflicts a relatively larger punishment on the manager for not acting in shareholders' interests.
It should be noted that, while it is important in our model that the threat of exit be credible, in many of the equilibria we analyze exit does not necessarily occur frequently in equilibrium. In some cases where the threat of exit has a strong disciplinary impact, exit actually takes place with probability zero in equilibrium.
There is an extensive theoretical literature on shareholder activism and on the role of large shareholders in corporate governance.
3 The models in this literature typically assume that the large shareholder can take a costly action, often called "monitoring," to affect the value of the firm. The possibility that the large shareholder can trade is sometimes considered in this literature, but the focus is generally on the incentives of the large shareholder to engage in monitoring and/or on the ownership structures that arise endogenously, and the implicit or explicit assumption is that monitoring is inconsistent with exit. In our model, by contrast, the ability of the large shareholder to exit is the sole "technology" by which the large shareholder attempts to impact managerial decisions. While in most of our analysis we take the information structure as given, our results have immediate implications for the case where information acquisition is endogenous. This is discussed in the concluding remarks.
The notion that stock prices may play a role in monitoring managers was discussed in Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) . Their model and the focus of their analysis differ from ours in several ways. In particular, Holmstrom and Tirole focus on how the ownership structure of the firm affects the value of market monitoring through its effect on liquidity and on the profits speculators realize in trading on information. In our model, by contrast, we focus on the disciplining impact of a large shareholder's threat of exit and examine how the effectiveness of this threat depends on the nature of the agency problem and the information structure.
More recently Gopalan (2005) and Edmans (2006) have also modeled the possibility that potential exit can have positive impact on the firm. In Gopalan (2005) , exit by an informed large shareholder can encourage another bidder to acquire information and implement improvements through a takeover mechanism. This mechanism for bringing about an improvement is obviously very different from the one at work in our model, which focuses on managerial incentives. The main difference between our model and that of Edmans (2006) is that our model addresses fundamental agency problem that are most extreme if the manager's compensation is not sensitive to prices and which are partly alleviated through the price dependence of the manager's compensation, while in Edmans (2006) there is no fundamental agency problem -the manager would always make the optimal decision from shareholder's perspective if his compensation were fixed salary. The agency problem in Edmans (2006) arises because of the combined assumptions that the manager's compensation depends on short term prices (as in our model), and that his actions affect the public information available to investors. In particular, in Edman's model the more productive the action, the more unfavorable is the public signal that is generated in the short term.
Empirical studies of the role and impact of large shareholders have documented various facts that are consistent with our model. In particular, Carleton, Nelson and Weisbach (1998) present evidence that large shareholders can affect firms' values through private negotiations. This is consistent with our model, because discipline through exit requires that the manager knows that the large shareholder is informed. Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003) provide evidence to support both the notion that large shareholders are better informed than other investors, as our model assumes, and the fact that they sometimes use their private information to "vote with their feet." They suggest that the price impact of these trade may affect corporate decisions. Sias, Starks and Titman (2001) also suggest that the price impact of large shareholder trading is likely due to superior information, consistent with our model. More recently, Massimo and Simonov (2006) and Qiu (2006) show that non-controlling large shareholders can have meaningful impact on managerial decisions, particularly in preventing managers from taking value-reducing actions (such as bad acquisitions). These results are generally consistent with our model. The concluding remarks offer additional discussion about the empirical implications of our results.
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce our basic model and the two agency problems in Section 2. Section 3 analyzes the case where the large shareholder's private information includes only the manager's action and no investor observes the effect of the action on the value of the firm until the final period. In Section 4 we examine what happens when the large shareholder privately observes both the manager's decision and its impact on the firm's value. Section 5 considers the case where the manager's action is observed by all investors and the large shareholder's private information includes only the action's implications. For completeness, we analyze in Section 6 the case in which the impact of the action on the firm value is publicly known, and the private information of the large shareholder only concerns whether the action is taken or not. In Section 7 we consider situations where exit by the large shareholder is costly to the large shareholder beyond its negative price impact because of transactions costs. We also consider the possibility that exit results in an additional cost that is borne by all shareholders, specifically a cost that is associated with loss of future monitoring benefits provided by the large shareholder. Section 8 discusses briefly two extensions where investors have additional uncertainty, and Section 9 offers concluding remarks.
The General Model
There are three periods in our model. In period 0 the manager, whom we denote by M, decides whether or not to take a particular action. An agency problem arises because M and the shareholders of the firm have conflicting preferences with respect to this action. We will analyze two distinct models using the same notation. In one model, which we refer to as Model B, the action available to M is "bad" in the sense that it is undesirable from shareholders' perspective, but the action produces a private benefit to M. In another model we analyze, Model G, the action is "good" for shareholders in that it increases the value of the firm, but it requires M to incur a private cost. We denote the value of the firm if M does not take the action by ν. If M takes the action in Model B, then the value of the firm decreases byδ ≥ 0 and becomes ν −δ, while M obtains a private benefit of β > 0. If the action is taken in Model G, then the value of the firm increases byδ ≥ 0 and becomes ν +δ, while M incurs a private cost of β > 0. These two models may seem like mirror images of one another but, as we will see, in our setting they can produce dramatically different results.
Our basic assumptions regarding uncertainty and the information structure are as follows. The status-quo value of the firm ν is fixed and common knowledge. This is without loss of generality in the sense that ν may be random but it is assumed that no agent has private information about it. (In fact, the value of ν will not play any significant role in our analysis.) In period zero, investors assess thatδ has a non-trivial continuous distribution f(·) with support on [0, δ], where δ is positive and possibly infinite. M observes the realization ofδ before making the decision whether to take the action or not. We further assume that the private cost or benefit β is fixed and known to all investors. (The possibility that β is random is discussed in Section 8.)
Since M makes his decision regarding the action after observingδ, his strategy can be described by a function a(δ), where a(δ) = 1 denotes the event in which M takes the action and a(δ) = 0 denotes the event in which he does not take it. In most of our analysis, investors will make inferences regarding the expected change in the firm value, which is given by a(δ)δ, given the information they have. To simplify the notation we will use the short-handã to represent M's action instead of a(δ). We assume that in the final period, investors do observe the realizations of bothã andδ. The value of the firm is therefore ν −ãδ in Model B and ν +ãδ in Model G.
We assume that the firm is owned by many small and passive investors as well as by a large shareholder, whom we denote by L. (For expositional clarity we will use female pronouns to refer to L.) The exact ownership structure will not matter to our results, since valuation will be done under risk neutrality. We assume that L observes some private information regardingã and/orδ in period 1, and that she may be in a position to sell her shares on the basis of this information. Because it generally reflects her private information, L's trading decision will have an impact on the firm's price in period 1. This in turn has the potential to affect M's decision if M cares about the market price of the firm in period 1. The manager's compensation is assumed to be linear in the realized market price of the firm in periods 1 and 2, P 1 and P 2 . Specifically, we assume that M's compensation is equal to ω 1 P 1 + ω 2 P 2 , where ω 1 and ω 2 are non-negative coefficients representing the dependence of the compensation on the firm's short-term ("Period 1") and long-term ("Period 2") price performance respectively. 4 We assume for most of our analysis that ω 1 and ω 2 are positive, but we will also consider the limit cases where ω 2 vanishes. If ω 1 = 0, then L will not be able to affect M's decision through her trade. The potential impact of L on M 's decision comes about through the impact of her trading decisions on P 1 . We assume that the prices, P 1 and P 2 , are set by riskneutral, competitive market makers and therefore reflect all of the information publicly available. This means that P 2 equals ν −ãδ in Model B and ν +ãδ in Model G. In Period 1, P 1 reflects the information contained in L's trading decision as is described in more detail below.
If M does not take the action, then his utility is simply his compensation, ω 1 P 1 + ω 2 P 2 . If he takes the action in Model B, M 's utility is equal to the sum of his compensation and the private benefit β. Similarly, if M takes the action in Model G, then his utility is equal to the compensation minus the private cost β. We assume that M chooses whether to take the action or not to maximize his expected utility for every realization ofδ.
We assume that L may be subject to a liquidity shock in period 1. Specifically, there is probability 0 < θ < 1 that, independent of her private information, L will need to sell her entire stake in period 1.
5 While the value of θ is common knowledge, only L knows her actual motives for trading when she trades. We generally assume that θ > 0, but our model is also well defined in the limit case where θ = 0, i.e., when L is never subject to a liquidity shock. As will become clear, most of our results will apply to this case as well, and we will often use it for illustration. The main complication for the θ = 0 case is that additional equilibria can arise that are not the limit of any equilibrium for the case θ > 0 as θ vanishes. 6 The equilibria we analyze for the 4 We take the form of M's compensation as exogenous here. Presumably, M's compensation balances risk sharing and various agency considerations. If the agency problem considered in this paper was the only relevant problem in the contracting environment between M and shareholders, then it would be reasonable to endogenize the dependence of the compensation on prices. However, we believe that in reality M 's compensation is designed to solve a more complex problem. We therefore limit ourselves to asking what disciplinary impact L can have given this compensation function. It might be interesting to examine the robustness of our results to other compensation functions or to attempt to endogenize the compensation within a more general agency framework.
5 It simplifies our analysis that there is only one quantity that L sells when she is subject to a liquidity shock. However, our results would not change if the liquidity shock entailed L selling less than her entire stake. Our model can also be analyzed under the assumption that L receives a shock that forces her to buy shares or a shock that might involve either buying or selling. We have not examined systematically all the variations of our model under these alternative trading assumptions, since our focus is on the disciplinary impact of the Wall Street Walk, i.e., the possibility of exit by the large shareholder. For those versions of the model that we have analyzed, however, which are those discussed in Section 3, we have found that having a positive probability of a liquidity buy trade does not change the qualitative nature of our results.
6 For example, there may be equilibria in which L never sells and therefore never has effect on θ > 0 cases always have a well-defined limit as θ goes to zero, and are indeed equilibria of the model in which θ = 0. 7 If she is not subject to a liquidity shock, L chooses whether or not to sell her shares if the expected value of the firm given all her information is smaller than P 1 , the price at which she would exit, where P 1 incorporates the information communicated by the sale.
We will analyze the Bayesian-Nash equilibria of Model B and Model G under various assumptions concerning what L and other investors observe in period 1. In such equilibria M , using his information, makes the optimal decision regarding his action, taking L's trading strategy as given. Similarly, L, based on her information, determines whether to sell her shares in the event that she is not subject to a liquidity shock.
8 Both M and L take as given the fact that P 1 will reflect the conditional expectation ofãδ based on the information available to investors, including L's trading decision, in period 1.
For most of our analysis we will make the following tie-breaking assumptions: (i) if M is indifferent between taking the action and not taking the action then he takes the action; (ii) if L is indifferent between selling her shares and not selling, she sells her shares. Generally, when we use these assumptions, they will not change the set of equilibria, becauseδ has a continuous distribution and indifference will hold for at most one realization ofδ. We will not employ these assumptions in cases where they would change the set of equilibria non-trivially, e.g., in the limit case where ω 2 = 0 or in the model whereδ is publicly observable in period 1 (which is analyzed in Section 6).
Given a particular realization ofδ, M must decide whether to take the action. It is easy to see that in the benchmark case in which L is not present andã is not observed by investors until period 2, M will take the action if and only ifδ ≤ β/ω 2 in Model B and if and only if δ ≥ β/ω 2 in model G. For most of our analysis we assume that β/ω 2 < δ, i.e., that there is a positive probability that M acts in the interests of the shareholders (refraining from taking the action in Model B and taking the action in Model G).
9 For a strategy of M that specifies whether he takes the action or not as a function ofδ, the ex ante expected value of the firm in Model B is ν − E(δã). Similarly, in model G, the ex ante value of the firm given M's strategy is ν + E(δã).
M 's decisions through her trading, or equilibria where L sells only some of her shares. Eliminating these equilibria would require restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs. 7 Thus, whenever we discuss L's equilibrium strategies for the case θ = 0, we will assume that they are obtained as the limit of her strategies when θ > 0. For example, if L is indifferent between selling and not selling her shares for a given value ofδ if θ = 0, but she strictly prefers to sell for the same value ofδ in the model whenever θ > 0, then we will assume that L sells her shares also in the model with θ = 0.
8 We do not need to consider trades by L that cannot arise from a liquidity shock, since such trades will generally lead to zero expected profits under reasonable assumptions about investors' beliefs. However, when investors cannot be sure whether L's trade is based on private information or liquidity, L makes positive profits when he trades on his information. See the discussion of L's information advantage in Section 7.
9 This assumption, which holds trivially when δ is infinite, is made for ease of presentation only. If ω 2 > 0 our results are easily modified when it does not hold. We will address the limit case where ω 2 = 0 separately in some of our analysis.
Note that the best outcome from shareholders' perspective in Model B is that M never takes the action, which means that highest value of the firm in this case is ν. Since the firm value is reduced byδ wheneverã = 1 relative to this best case, the ex ante expected agency cost associated with the action in Model B is E(δã). Analogously, the first best from shareholders' perspective in Model G is that M always takes the action, which increases the value of the firm from ν to ν +δ. Since the increase ofδ is not realized wheneverã = 1, the ex ante expected agency cost in Model G is equal to E(δ(1 −ã)) = E(δ) − E(δã). Thus, in Model B the ex ante expected agency cost is reduced if E(δã) is made lower, while the opposite is true in Model G. We will be interested in the impact that L's presence has on the ex ante expected agency cost in the two models, which from now on we will simply refer to as agency cost. This impact is measured by the difference between the agency cost in the equilibrium where L is not present and the agency cost in the equilibrium when L is present. It will be useful to use the following terms:
Definition: Consider the impact that L's presence has on the agency cost associated with the action.
(i) An equilibrium is disciplining if L's presence has a positive impact, i.e., the agency cost is lower when L is present than when she is not present.
(ii) An equilibrium is non-disciplining if L's presence has no impact on the agency cost.
(iii) An equilibrium is dysfunctional if L's presence has a negative impact, i.e., the agency cost is higher when L is present than when she is not present.
It is easy to see that in order for the equilibrium to be disciplining, L must have some information aboutã in period 1, and that some of her information at that point must be private. We will examine L's impact under various information structures that satisfy this condition. We will at times also compare, for the same model specifications, L's effectiveness in Model B vs. Model G. To distinguish the different information structures, we will use superscripts to denote the information observed by L in period 1, and subscripts to denote the information (if any) that is publicly observed by all investors in period 1. For example, Model B a is Model B where L observesã in period 1 and investors do not observe eitherã orδ directly until period 2; Model G a,δ a is Model G whereã is observed publicly in period 1, and, in addition, L observesδ privately in period 1. Note that when there is no subscript, investors do not observe eitherã orδ in period 1. When there is no superscript, the model is the base or benchmark model where L is not present.
Action-Only Monitoring
We start our analysis by assuming that L observes privately whether M has taken the action, i.e., the realization ofã. However, neither L nor other investors are assumed to observe the realization ofδ until period 2. The models in this section therefore are denoted by the superscript a (and no subscript).
Consider first Model B
a . It is easy to see that, since the action reduces the value of the firm, in every equilibrium of this model L sells her shares whenever she observes that M has taken the action. 10 Let E s be the expected value ofãδ conditional on L selling her shares and E ns be the expected value ofãδ conditional on L not selling her shares. Then the price of the firm in period 1, P 1 , can take on two possible values, ν − E s if L sells her shares, and ν − E ns if she does not. Note that, when θ > 0, L might be forced to sell for liquidity reasons even if M does not take the action, and this, together with the strategies of L and M , will need to be incorporated into the determination of E s and E ns .
If M takes the action for a particular δ, P 2 is equal to ν − δ. Since L exits with probability 1 when M takes the action, P 1 is equal to ν − E s . Thus, M 's expected utility is
(1)
If M does not take the action then P 2 = ν, and P 1 is equal to ν − E s with probability θ and ν − E ns with probability 1 − θ, because L sells if and only if she is subject to a liquidity shock. Thus, M 's expected utility if he does not take the action is
Comparing these, we conclude that M will take the action if and only if
The potential impact of L's presence comes about through the second term in the equation above,
This term depends on the difference between the first-period price given a sale by L and the first-period price given that L retains her shares. To the extent that exit reflects negative information, this is negative. The absolute value of this difference measures the extent to which L exerts "punishment" on M by selling her shares and driving the price down when M takes the action. Note that, since ω 2 > 0, the left-hand side of (3) is decreasing in δ. This implies that if M prefers to take the action for a given δ, then he must strictly prefer to take it for all smaller values. An equilibrium of Model B a will therefore be characterized by a cutoff point x such that the action is taken if and only ifδ ≤ x. Given such a strategy for M, and since L sells her shares if M takes the action or if she is subject to a liquidity shock, we have
Note that we use the notation E s (x) to signify the dependence of E s on the cutoff point x. Since investors can infer thatã = 0 (the action was not taken) if L does not sell her shares, E ns (x) = 0 independent of x. The calculation of E s (x) takes into account that with probability θ a sale by L is due to a liquidity shock and therefore is uninformative aboutãδ, while with probability 1 − θ a sale implies thatã = 1 and therefore, given M's strategy, thatδ ≤ x. Note that for a given x, E s (x) is decreasing in θ, and in the limit case where
Conversely, when θ vanishes, E s approaches E(δ |δ ≤ x) since in this case a sale conveys perfectly thatã = 1.
Now consider M's decision whether or not to take the action. Sinceδ has a continuous distribution, it is easy to see that in any disciplining equilibrium, M must be indifferent between taking and not taking the action at the equilibrium cutoffδ = x B .
11 Thus, x B must satisfy
Let us now turn to Model G a . Since the action increases the value of the firm, in every equilibrium L sells her shares if the action is not taken (or if she is subject to a liquidity shock), and retains her shares if the action is taken. Let E s and E ns be the conditional expectations of aδ given sale and no sale by L respectively. If M takes the action forδ = δ, then P 2 = ν + δ, and, since L sells if and only if she is subject to a liquidity shock, P 1 is equal to ν + E s with probability θ and ν + E ns with probability 1 − θ. Thus, M 's expected utility if he takes the action is
If M does not take the action, then P 1 = ν + E s , since L sells with probability 1, and P 2 = ν. Thus, M 's expected utility if he does not take the action is
It follows that M prefers to take the action if and only if
The left-hand side of (8) is increasing in δ, so an equilibrium for this model involves a cutoff point x such that M takes the action if and only ifδ ≥ x. Since L sells her shares if she is subject to a liquidity shock or if M does not take the action, we have for Model G a , again using the notation E s (x) and E ns (x) to signify the dependence of prices on M's cutoff point,
In Model G a , no sale by L communicates to investors that the action was definitely taken (ã = 1), and thus thatδ ≥ x. A sale by L communicates that either the action was not taken (and thereforẽ a = 0 andδ < x), or that L was subject to a liquidity shock, which is uninformative aboutã and δ. Fixing x, E s (x) is increasing in θ. In the limit when θ = 1, a sale is uninformative aboutãδ and thus E s (x) = Pr(δ ≥ x)E(δ |δ ≥ x). As θ vanishes, however, a sale implies that the action was definitely not taken, and thus in the limit E s (x) = 0.
An equilibrium for Model G a will be characterized by a cutoff x G such that M is indifferent between taking and not taking the action whenδ = x G , and thus
As already observed, if L is not present, then the equilibrium cutoff point in both models is equal to β/ω 2 . That is, in this benchmark case the action is taken forδ ≤ x B = β/ω 2 in Model B and forδ ≥ x G = β/ω 2 in model G. Note also that in both models, shareholders are better off the lower is the equilibrium cutoff point, because whenδ is below the cutoff point in both models, M is not acting in their best interests. The discipline L is able to exert on M's actions is thus measured in both models by how low the equilibrium cutoff is. The following result characterizes the equilibrium for both models and compares Model B a with Model G a in terms of L's effectiveness in disciplining M . The proofs of this and other results are found in the appendix. This proposition states that when L observesã privately and no investor observesδ until period 2, the credible threat that L will exit if M does not act in shareholders' interests is an effective disciplining tool and reduces the agency cost. L's impact is decreasing in θ, the probability that she is subject to a liquidity shock, because a higher value of θ makes her trades less informative and reduces her ability to "punish" M for not acting in shareholders' interests.
Perhaps surprisingly, since the two models appear as mirror images of one another, part (iv) of Proposition 1 states that, fixing all the model's parameters, L is more effective in Model G a than she is in Model B a . To understand this result, note first that given that the action is taken, the difference between the value of the firm when the action is taken and when it is not is larger in Model G a than in Model B a . This is because the manager takes the action for an interval of the highest values ofδ in Model G a and for an interval of the lowest values ofδ in Model B a . (Indeed, this is true for the benchmark models G and B, where L is not present.) This will translate to L being able to impact the manager's decision more effectively in Model G a , because there will be a bigger price difference when L sells relative to when she does not sell. This is seen most clearly in the limit case θ = 0, where L is not subject to a liquidity shock. In Model
Clearly, for any candidate cutoff point x and any distribution forδ,
in Model B a for any x holds also when 0 < θ < 1, and the information communicated aboutã by L's sales is imperfect. This means that L has a larger impact on M 's compensation for any cutoff level x in Model G a than she has in Model B a , which implies that for the equilibrium cutoffs we have
A related observation is that L's disciplining tool, |E s (x) − E ns (x)|, behaves differently in the two models as the cutoff x goes to zero, i.e., as we approach the best situation (in both models) from shareholders perspective. In Model B a , this is equal to E(δ |δ ≤ x), which goes to zero as x vanishes. Thus, as M's preferences get better aligned with those of shareholders, the tool that L can use to discipline M vanishes in Model B a . This is not true in Model G a ,
where L always has a non-trivial disciplining tool, because the difference between the price when L does not sell and the price when L sells always remains bounded away from zero. If θ = 0,
has a positive lower bound that depends on θ. Thus, L is better able to exert discipline in Model G a than in Model B a .
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The reader might wonder whether our results might change if the specification of the possible liquidity trades is different. For example, would the results continue to hold if there is a positive It is interesting to examine whether and to what extent L can have a positive disciplinary impact when ω 2 = 0, i.e., M 's compensation does not depend on the long-term price P 2 . Note first that if ω 2 = 0 and L is not present, the agency problem is particularly severe since M's compensation is independent of his action. Thus, M will always act against the shareholders' interests, taking the action for everyδ in Model B and never taking the action in Model G. It follows that any equilibrium of Model B a in which there is a positive probability that M does not take the action is a disciplining equilibrium, and similarly any equilibrium of Model G a in which M takes the action with positive probability is also disciplining. Now note that when ω 2 = 0 and L is present, M's compensation still does not depend on the actual realization ofδ but only on the absolute difference |E s − E ns | that depends on L's trading strategy. This means that it is no longer true that in every equilibrium of Model B a the manager takes the action for realizations ofδ below a cutoff point and that in every equilibrium of Model G a he must take the action for all realizations ofδ above a cutoff point, and that M is only indifferent between taking and not taking the action at the equilibrium cutoff point. In fact, when ω 2 = 0, similar logic to that of (5) and (10) implies that in any disciplining equilibrium M must be indifferent between taking and not taking the action for every realization ofδ.
The analysis of the case ω 2 = 0 turns out to be quite complicated, but it leads to some interesting results, which are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 2: Assume that ω 2 = 0 and ω 1 > 0.
(i) In both Models B a and G a , the equilibria described in Proposition 1 have well defined limits as ω 2 vanishes. The limit of the equilibria in each case is an equilibrium for the models with ω 2 = 0.
(ii) In any disciplining equilibrium of either model, where the manager takes the action whenδ ≥ x G for a cutoff x G , is the one where the probability that a liquidity shock would lead L to buy shares? We have analyzed Model B a and Model G a with this assumption. One complication that arises when there is a positive probability that L will buy shares due to a liquidity shock is that multiple equilibria may arise. Nevertheless, it can be shown that the equilibria in both models are disciplining and that the lowest equilibrium cutoff for Model G a is smaller than the lowest equilibrium cutoff for Model B a . Details of this analysis are available upon request.
agency cost is the smallest among all the equilibria , i.e., where L is the most effective in disciplining the manager.
This result shows that L can have a disciplinary impact on M 's action when ω 2 = 0, but that there are often multiple equilibria in this case.
13 Models B a and G a may now have equilibria that have similar forms, but the models continue to produce very different results. Unlike the case ω 2 > 0, it is no longer true in general that L is more effective in Model G a than she is in Model B a in all of the equilibria.
The proposition states that when ω 2 = 0, the best equilibria from shareholders' perspective in both Model B a and Model G a have the form we have encountered earlier for Model G a , where M takes the action for realizations ofδ above a cutoff. Note that in Model G a , these relatively large realizations ofδ represent the most beneficial ones from shareholders' perspective, while in Model B a these realizations are the most harmful from shareholders' perspective. Thus, perhaps surprisingly, the equilibrium with the lowest agency cost in Model B a involves M taking the action for the worst realizations ofδ. The key to this result is that, although the realizations for which the action is taken are the worst for shareholders, in this equilibrium the probability that M takes the action is the smallest among all the equilibria. As we show in the proof of this result, the agency costs are monotone and decreasing in the probability that the action is taken in equilibrium.
Is L More Effective with More Private Information?
We now assume that L is able to observe privately not only whether M has taken the action, i.e., the realization ofã, but also the realization ofδ. We continue to assume that neitherã norδ is observed by other investors until period 2. As will become clear, the resulting models, denoted B a,δ and G a,δ , produce dramatically different results from one another with this information structure, and we will therefore discuss them separately.
Consider Model B a,δ first. Note that with ω 2 > 0, any equilibrium must still involve M taking the action only ifδ falls below a cutoff point. This follows immediately from considerations similar to those in the previous section. Again it is easy to see that in any equilibrium L prefers not to sell her shares if M does not take the action. However, when L observesδ it is no longer the case that she always prefers to sell when the action is taken by M. Ifδ < E s , where E s is the market's conditional expectation ofãδ given that L sells her shares, then even if M takes the action, the price response to the sale, measured by E s , is more severe than the loss to the value of the firm that L will incur if she retains her shares, which is equal toδ. Thus, L will not want to sell ifδ < E s .
The above implies that if M takes the action forδ ≤ x, then we must have
and
Note that a sale by L communicates that either the action was taken and L chose to sell, i.e.,
, or L was subject to a liquidity shock. No sale by L communicates that either the action was not taken, or that it was taken andδ < E s (x). An equilibrium cutoff point x B will satisfy the indifference condition for M given again by
The following result states that an equilibrium for Model B a,δ with the characterization described above exists, and that L always has a disciplinary impact in equilibrium. Note that L has a disciplinary impact in this model even though in equilibrium an actual exit may be observed quite rarely. This is unlike Model B a , where L sells her shares in equilibrium wheneverδ ≤ x B . In fact, when the probability of a liquidity shock θ is very small, L is extremely unlikely to exit in the equilibrium of Model B a,δ . Nevertheless, L can have a significant disciplinary impact. When L exits, the market concludes that, except for the possibility of a liquidity shock,ãδ ∈ [E s (x B ), x B ] and therefore that not only was the action likely to have been taken, but that, if the action was taken, thenδ is in the relatively more "harmful" range of values.
In the limit when θ vanishes, L only exits whenδ = x B , i.e., with probability zero. A sale in this case communicates that the action was taken and thatδ is equal to the worst value for which the action is taken in equilibrium, namely x B . 15 Note, however, while the price impact of a sale is more pronounced, the information content of L not selling, is diminished. In particular, in the limit case when θ = 0, since L sells with probability zero, no information aboutãδ is communicated if L does not sell, and thus E ns (x B ) is equal the unconditional expectation ofãδ given M's strategy of taking the action forδ ≤ x B , namely Pr(δ ≤ x B )E(δ |δ ≤ x B ).
Is L's impact larger in Model B a,δ , where she has more information, than in Model B a ? It turns out that the answer to this is ambiguous in general. We will consider first the limit case where θ = 0, and then discuss the general case θ > 0. Let x be a candidate cutoff point for M's strategy. If M takes the action whenδ ≤ x, then in Model B a , E s (x) = E(δ |δ ≤ x) and E ns (x) = 0.
As noted above, in Model B a,δ , we have E s (x) = x, and E ns (x) = Pr(δ ≤ x)E(δ |δ ≤ x). This is summarized in the table below:
M's decision whether to take the action depends on E s (x) − E ns (x). Note that for any x, both E s (x) and E ns (x) are larger in Model B a,δ than they are in Model B a . When L exits, the action is likely to be in a relatively more harmful range in Model B a,δ than in Model B a , but when L does not exit, the action may have still been taken in Model B a,δ but not in Model B a .
Thus, it is not clear which of the models produces a larger difference E s (x) − E ns (x) at the equilibrium cutoff point.
Consider as an example the case whereδ is distributed uniformly over [0, 1], β = 0.4, ω 1 = 1 and ω 2 = 0.5. If L is not present, then for this example M takes the action if and only ifδ ≤ β/ω 2 = 0.8. Figure 1 shows the equilibrium cutoffs x B as well as the price impact of exit, measured by E s (x B ) in the equilibrium of both models for all values of θ. We see that x B is increasing in θ for both models, which is intuitive. When θ is small, L is more effective in Model B a,δ than she is in Model B a . However, for values of θ above 0.25, the reverse is true,
i.e, L is less effective when she has private information aboutδ in addition toã. The result that L is more effective in Model B a,δ when θ is small (or even just for θ = 0) does not generalize to other distributions ofδ, and generally which of the two models produces better discipline is ambiguous. However, for every distribution ofδ and the model's other parameters, Model B a always produces better discipline than Model B a,δ as θ grows towards 1. This is stated in the following proposition and explained intuitively below. To understand this result note that in both models, as θ becomes large E s (x) converges to E(δã) = Pr(δ ≤ x)E(δ |δ ≤ x), because the probability that L sells grows to 1 and thus a sale becomes less informative aboutãδ. However, in Model B a,δ , even as θ grows, E ns (x) remains strictly positive, while in Model B a , E ns (x) is always equal to zero. Intuitively, as θ becomes large, exit carries the same (diminishing) information in both models, but the event in which L does not sell has very different information content in the two models. In Model B a it guarantees that the action was not taken by M , while in Model B a,δ it is also consistent with the action being taken butδ < E s (x). This means that for θ sufficiently large, E s (x) − E ns (x) is larger in Model B a than it is in Model B a,δ for all positive values of x, which implies that L is more effective in Model B a , where she does not have the private information aboutδ.
We now turn to the Model G a,δ . In stark contrast to the previous discussion, we will show that L is never more effective in Model G a,δ than she is in Model G a , and, moreover, it is possible that the only equilibrium in Model G a,δ is non-disciplining even though the equilibrium for Model G a is disciplining for the same parameters. Thus, no additional disciplinary impact ever arises from the additional information ofδ in Model G a,δ relative to Model G a , and the additional information may actually make L completely ineffective in disciplining M . We will also see that, unlike Model B a,δ , which possesses at least one and possibly multiple equilibria, Model G a,δ has at most one equilibrium and it is possible that a (Bayesian-Nash) equilibrium does not exist for this model. This is summarized in the following result and discussed and illustrated further below. 
non-disciplining and has x G = β/ω 2 .
To obtain some intuition, first observe that for reasons similar to those discussed earlier, in any equilibrium of Model G a,δ , M's strategy must involve taking the action if and only ifδ ≥ x for some cutoff point x. Consider E s (x), the market's expectation ofãδ given a sale by L. If an equilibrium cutoff x G exists, there are two possibilities: either
Then we claim that L's strategy must be the same as her strategy in the equilibrium of Model G a , namely to sell if M does not take the action and retain her shares (unless subject to a liquidity shock) if M takes the action. This follows because, ifδ
, and L does not want to sell her shares, while forδ < x G , L clearly prefers to sell because the action was not taken and Now consider the possibility of an equilibrium for Model G a,δ in which E s (x G ) > x G . In this case whenδ = x G , L sells her shares whether M takes the action or not, which means that whenδ = x G , the first-period price P 1 is the same whether M takes the action or not. Thus, whenδ = x G , L cannot have an impact on M's decision. It follows that x G must be equal to β/ω 2 , which is the cutoff when L is not present. We conclude that the only possible equilibrium of Model G a,δ in which E s (x G ) > x G is a non-disciplining equilibrium with x G = β/ω 2 . Note that in this equilibrium L will typically use her private information aboutδ to sell her shares when β/ω 2 <δ < E s (β/ω 2 ) even though M takes the action. This, of course, has to be factored into the determination of E s (β/ω 2 ) in this model, but it does not have an impact on M 's decision.
It is also possible that no equilibrium exists in Model G a,δ . This occurs when E s (x G ) in Model G a exceeds x G and at the same time x G = β/ω 2 is not an equilibrium for Model G a,δ because E s (β/ω 2 ) < β/ω 2 . Such a case is illustrated in Figure 2 . For this example we assume that δ is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], β = 0.33, ω 1 = 0.25 and ω 2 = 1. For small θ, the equilibrium in Model G a,δ is the same as that in Model G a since for small enough θ, x G in non-disciplining equilibrium
No equilibrium
Figure 2: An example of existence and non-existence of equilibrium in Model G a,δ .
since E s (β/ω 2 ) > β/ω 2 = x G , and thus L sells her shares for everyδ ≤ β/ω 2 . Note that in the cases where θ is large and L has no effect on M's behavior, L would have been effective in disciplining M if she only observedã; in these cases x G in Model G a is strictly less than β/ω 2 .
It is when L is more informed and knows bothã andδ that she becomes ineffective.
The figure shows that there is an intermediate region (0.265 < θ < 0.5) where an equilibrium does not exist in this example. In this region E s (x G ) > x G in the equilibrium of Model G a , and so the equilibrium of Model G a is not an equilibrium for Model G a,δ . At the same time, the only other equilibrium candidate, x G = β/ω 2 , produces a contradiction because if M takes the action forδ ≥ β/ω 2 and L exits whenever the action is not taken (which is what she does in Model G a ), then E s (β/ω 2 ) < β/ω 2 and so L does not want to sell. Since there is no equilibrium with E s (x G ) > x G and there is no equilibrium with E s (x G ) ≤ x G , an equilibrium does not exist.
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In summary, we have seen that if, in addition to observing whether the action is taken, L has private information about the consequences of the action, her disciplinary impact may be enhanced, but in many cases it will actually be weakened substantially relative to the case where she does not have this additional information. In Model B a,δ , L still has disciplinary impact. Exit 17 One might think that this nonexistence problem would disappear if both L and M were permitted to use mixed strategies. This is not the case since L can only be indifferent between selling and not selling whenδ = E s (x G ), and M can only be indifferent between taking the action and not taking the action whenδ = x G . Since we assume thatδ has a continuous distribution, using a mixed strategy for any particular realization ofδ will not affect the equilibrium. is a more powerful threat, having a larger price impact because it occurs only for the relatively more harmful consequences, but, since L may retain her shares even if the action is taken, the information content of no exit by L is reduced relative to the model where onlyã is observed by L. Whether the overall disciplinary impact is enhanced by the additional information is ambiguous in general. However, when the probability of a liquidity shock is high, L's effectiveness tends to be lower when she has the information aboutδ. We also saw that additional information aboutδ never enhances L's disciplinary impact in Model G a,δ relative to Model G a . At best, the equilibrium of the two models is the same. In other cases, Model G a,δ only possesses a non-disciplining equilibrium or no equilibrium at all.
Can L's Presence Exacerbate the Agency Problem?
In the models we have analyzed to this point we have shown that L's presence generally has a disciplinary impact on M and the worst equilibrium in terms of the agency cost is one where L has no impact at all. We have not encountered a dysfunctional equilibrium, one in which L's impact is negative. This will change below. We will consider an information structure wherẽ a is public in period 1, i.e., all investors observe whether M takes the action, and L's private information consists of the realization ofδ. Again, and quite dramatically, our two models will produce very different results. We first show that the equilibrium of Model B a,δ a is disciplining; in fact, the agency cost in this model is lower than that in either Model B a or Model B a,δ . (However, this does not imply that L has a higher impact in this model, because the benchmark case where L is not present is different whenã is public than when it is not.) By contrast, we show that in Model G a,δ a the equilibrium is dysfunctional, and L's presence increases the agency cost relative to the case where she is not present.
In the models analyzed so far, whereã is not observed by investors until period 2, if L is not present, then discipline is only provided by the impact of the action on P 2 , and so the equilibrium of Model B is that M takes the action whenδ ≤ β/ω 2 . Now consider Model B a , where L is not present andã is public. Since ω 2 > 0, equilibrium must again involve a cutoff x such that M takes the action if and only ifδ ≤ x. If M is observed taking the action, investors conclude that δ ≤ x. Without any additional information, the expected value ofãδ is E(δ |δ ≤ x), and thus P 1 = ν − E(δ |δ ≤ x). Since P 1 = ν if M does not take the action, the equilibrium cutoff x B is determined by
Note that this is the same as the equilibrium cutoff in Model B a when θ = 0, i.e., where L observesã privately and she is never subject to a liquidity shock (see Proposition 1). This is intuitive, since in this case L exits if and only if the action is taken, and so in equilibrium investors know exactly when the action is taken in both Model B a with θ = 0 and in Model B a .
Now consider Model B
a,δ a , whereã is public and L observesδ privately. If the action is not taken, then the price in period 1 is ν independent of L's trade, and L sells only when she is subject to the liquidity shock. If the action is taken, then, as in Model B a,δ , L sells whenever
, where x is the cutoff value ofδ below which the action is taken. This means that we must have
In equilibrium, M must again be indifferent between taking and not taking the action at the cutoffδ = x B . This means that any equilibrium cutoff x B in Model B a,δ a must satisfy
Note that E ns (x B ), which measures the price impact of no sale, does not affect the determination of x B in this model, because if M takes the action whenδ = x B , then L sells her shares for sure, while if M does not take the action, P 1 = ν independent of L's trading. In other words, since M can be sure that P 1 = ν if he does not take the action, and since L always exits wheñ δ = x B , the inference investors would make if L retains her shares is irrelevant to M's decision whenδ = x B .
The next result confirms that there exists a unique equilibrium to Model B a,δ a and compares the agency cost associated with the action in this model to that in the equilibria of Models B a and B a,δ analyzed in previous sections. The key to understanding how L's presence affects M 's behavior is to examine M's incentives at the cutoff realizationδ = x below which the action is taken. In general, this depends on the difference between the (expected) first-period price, P 1 , when M takes the action and when he does not. While the short-term compensation difference between taking and not taking the action is only a function of L's trading decisions in Models B a and B a,δ , this is no longer true when M's action is publicly observable in period 1. The following table shows the first-period price in the three models when M does and does not take the action. All prices are given as a function of the cutoff point x under the assumption that θ = 0.
Not take Action Takes Action Difference
First consider the comparison between Model B a,δ and Model B a,δ a . When θ = 0 andδ is at the cutoff x, if M takes the action, L exits and this reveals perfectly thatãδ = x in both models, since this is the only realization ofδ for which L exits. If M does not take the action, however, then in Model B a,δ a , P 1 = ν since this will be observable to investors, but in Model B a,δ investors only observe that L is not selling, which provides no information aboutãδ and the resulting first-period price is ν − E(δã) = ν − Pr(δ ≤ x)E(δ |δ ≤ x). In other words, in both of these models M will suffer the "maximal hit" to his compensation when he takes the action at the cutoff point, but the consequences of not taking the action are quite different. In Model B a,δ investors do not learn anything from L not exiting, since they do not observeã and since L only exits whenδ = x. However, sinceã is public in Model B a,δ a , the first-period price will reflect the fact that the action was not taken. This means that the consequences of taking the action are greater in Model B a,δ a and thus the agency cost in the equilibrium of Model B a,δ a is lower than that in any equilibrium of Model B a,δ .
We now compare Model B a , where L observesã privately and no investor observesδ, and Model B a,δ a , whereã is public and L observesδ privately. In both of these models, although for different reasons, P 1 = ν if M does not take the action. In Model B a this is because L retains her shares only if the action is not taken, while in Model B a,δ a this is because it is publicly observed that the action was not taken. The difference in discipline comes about because if M takes the action at the cutoffδ = x, then in Model B a L sells her shares and investors only know that δ ≤ x, and thus P 1 = ν − E(δ |δ ≤ x), while in Model B a,δ a investors know from the fact that L exits thatδ = x. It follows that at any possible cutoff point x the difference between P 1 when M does not take the action and when he does is again greater in Model B a,δ a than it is in B a , which implies the equilibrium cutoff point in Model B a,δ a is always lower than that in Model B a , and thus again that the agency cost is smaller.
The above discussion, with appropriate modifications, applies to the model with θ > 0. Model B a,δ a produces the best outcome from shareholders' perspectives among the models considered so far, because, as in Model B a , M is able to obtain the highest compensation when he does not take the action and at the same time, as in Model B a,δ , he suffers the most severe consequences when he does take the action at the cutoff point. Note, however, that this does not imply that L has a larger disciplinary impact in Model B a,δ a than she does in the other models, because the benchmark situation where L is not present is different whenã is public information than wheñ a is not public information in period 1. In fact, it can be shown that the L's impact can be higher or lower in Model B a,δ a relative to Models B a and B a,δ .
Let us now turn to Model G a,δ a , and again let us start with Model G a where L is not present andã is public. If M is observed taking the action and L is not present, the expected value of δ will be E(δ |δ ≥ x), and thus the price in period 1 will be ν + E(δ |δ ≥ x), where x is the cutoff such that M takes the action if and only ifδ ≥ x. Since the price if M does not take the action is ν, the equilibrium cutoff x G is determined by
Note that again this is the same as the equilibrium cutoff point in Model G a when θ = 0, i.e.,
where L observesã privately and is never subject to a liquidity shock. This is because a sale by L in Model G a with θ = 0 communicates perfectly that the action was not taken. Now
a . Sinceã is publicly observed, if the action is not taken, then again P 1 = ν independent of whether L sells. If the action is taken forδ ≥ x, then L exits whenδ ≤ E s (x). Note that we must have x ≤ E s (x) because ifã = 1 then it is publicly known thatãδ ≥ x. This means that
The equilibrium cutoff x G in model G a,δ a must solve
Note that, analogous to the case of Model B a,δ a , if the action is taken forδ ≥ x, then E ns (x) = E(δ |δ > E s (x)), but E ns (·) does not affect the determination of the equilibrium cutoff x G , because whenδ is equal to the cutoff point, which is the lowest possible value ofδ for which the beneficial action is taken, L strictly prefers to sell her shares whether the action is taken or not, and thus P 1 = ν + E s (x G ) with probability 1.
The next result states the existence of a unique equilibrium for Model G a,δ a . Most interestingly, it shows that whenã is public information in period 1, having L privately observeδ and potentially trade on this information actually reduces the discipline placed on M. In other words, the agency cost in Model G a,δ a is higher than that in Model G a where L is not present, which means that the equilibrium of Model G a,δ a is dysfunctional. To understand why L's presence is harmful in this model, consider again M 's incentives at a cutoff point x. When L is not present, if M takes the action, he is rewarded by increase in his first-period compensation equal to ω 1 E(δ |δ ≥ x), because investors have no information about δ other than what is revealed by the fact that M has chosen to take the action, which means that δ ≥ x. In Model G a,δ a , L exits whenδ = x, since the selling price, ν + E s (x), is larger than the value of the firm given that M takes the action, given by ν + x. Exit by L communicates that the realization ofδ is relatively low among the values ofδ for which the action is taken, since L only chooses to sell whenδ ∈ [x, E s (x)]. (In the extreme case in which θ = 0, L only sells whenδ = x, and thus E s (x) = x.) Thus, whenδ = x, L's trading causes the market to revise downward its expectation ofδ relative to the expectation based only on M's willingness to take the action. For any potential cutoff x, this lowers the differential compensation for M between taking the action and not taking the action in Model G a,δ a relative to Model G a . It follows that L's presence reduces M 's incentives to take the value-enhancing action and shareholders would be better off if L was not present.
Note that this implies that for θ = 0, the agency cost in Model G a,δ a is strictly higher than that in Model G a , because in this case Model G a is identical to Model G a : in both of these models investors know perfectly when the action is taken but nothing more aboutδ. Since we already observed that Model G a,δ produces the same or a worse outcome than Model G a , it follows that, 
The Model with Action-Only Uncertainty
For completeness, we now discuss the one remaining information structure in which L's trading potentially has an impact on M 's actions. Here all investors are assumed to observeδ in period 1, while L observes, in addition, whether M has taken the action. In other words, there is no uncertainty aboutδ, but only L observesã in period 1. As we will show, this is actually an information structure where Model B and Model G behave like mirror images of one another and, for the same parameters, produce the same type of results in terms of L's impact. This highlights the critical role played by the inferences investors need to make aboutδ for some of our results so far.
When investors know the realization ofδ, equilibrium will depend on the realized value δ. The prior distribution ofδ will not play any role in determining the equilibrium. However, to the extent thatδ is drawn from a particular distribution, one can still discuss the agency costs averaging over the possible values of δ that investors observe in period 1. The next result characterizes the equilibrium and the agency cost in Models B Note that this is the only information structure we have studied in which there is complete symmetry between Model B and Model G, as one might expect in a standard principal-agent setting. This suggests that the results in previous sections were driven by the inference investors must make in period 1 about the consequences of the action,δ, based on L's trading behavior.
Discipline when Exit is Costly
So far we have assumed that L incurs no costs in exiting other than the price impact of her sale, which is due to the information revealed by L's willingness to sell. In this section we assume that exit entails additional costs to L and possibly to other shareholders. For example, there may be a transactions cost that L must pay when she trades. Alternatively, L's exit may lower the value of the firm, because exit results in a loss of future benefits to the firm that would be realized through L's continued presence as a shareholder. Additional exit costs, no matter what the source, generally affect L's willingness to exit, and this can affect discipline by making L's threat of exit less credible. The two types of costs are different, however, in that a simple transactions cost is borne only by L, whereas a loss in the value of the firm created by L's exit is borne by all shareholders and enters M 's compensation directly. As we will see, these two types of exit costs will lead to different results.
Below we analyze Model B a in the presence of each of these two types of exit costs. (To focus on the different issues that arise in the two cases, we analyze each type of exit cost separately.) Relative to the case analyzed in Section 3, we show the following: (i) L's disciplinary impact is either the same or lower when she must incur a transactions cost to exit; (ii) with either type of exit cost, equilibrium may involve L using a mixed strategy where she exits with a probability smaller than 1 if M takes the action; (iii) L's impact may be increasing in the probability of a liquidity shock θ; and (iv) L may be more effective in disciplining M if her exit lowers the value of the firm than in the base case where it does not.
Suppose first that in Model B a , L must incur a transactions cost of τ whenever she sells her shares. Assume that L still sells whenever she is subject to a liquidity shock and that a liquidity-motivated sale occurs with probability θ. With ω 2 > 0, M again takes the action wheñ δ ≤ x for some x. If L is not subject to a liquidity shock, she will sell only if the difference between E(δ |δ ≤ x), the expectation ofãδ given her information, and E s (x), the price impact of her sale, exceeds the transactions cost τ . We will refer to the difference E(δ |δ
The information advantage L has depends on how much of her information is revealed in equilibrium. If L sells whenever the action is taken, then it is straightforward to show that her information advantage is given by
Note that L only has an information advantage when θ > 0. If θ = 0, then a sale by L reveals that the action was taken with probability 1, and thus E s (x) = E(δ |δ ≤ x). It follows that when θ = 0, L will not be willing to pay the transactions cost, and the equilibrium must therefore be non-disciplining. When θ is positive, L has an information advantage since she knows whether she is trading for information or liquidity reasons. This information advantage may, however, be insufficient to cover the transactions cost. In such a case there may be no equilibrium in pure strategies. To see this, letx = β/ω 2 be the cutoff in a non-disciplining equlibrium and let x B be the equilibrium cutoff if L exits whenever the action is taken. Assume that
The term on the left of (23) is the information advantage L has in a non-disciplining equilibrium. The term on the right of (23) is L's information advantage in equilibrium assuming she sells whenever M takes the action. If (23) holds, then L strictly prefers to trade on her information when it is assumed she does not trade on her information, and L strictly prefers not to trade on her information when it is assumed that she trades on it whenever she is not subject to a liquidity shock. There is therefore no equilibrium in which L uses a pure strategy.
To analyze mixed-strategy equilibria, suppose that when M takes the action and L is not subject to a liquidity shock, L sells with probability ψ. Then for a given cutoff point x and a mixing probability ψ, E s (x) and E ns (x) are given by:
Note that when ψ < 1, investors can no longer conclude from L retaining her shares that the action was not taken. Thus, unlike Model B a without transactions costs, E ns (x) is not equal to zero. L's information advantage when she uses a mixing probability ψ is given by
Note that this is decreasing in the mixing probability ψ.
In a mixed-strategy equilibrium, the equilibrium cutoff for M, x B , and the equilibrium mixing strategy for L, ψ, are such that (i) M is indifferent between taking and not taking the action wheñ δ = x B and (ii) L is indifferent between selling and not selling when M takes the action. For the latter to occur, the information advantage given in (25) must equal τ .
We do not offer a general existence result for the model with a transactions cost. However, Figure 3 illustrates some examples, where we assume thatδ has a uniform distribution on [0, 1], ω 1 = ω 2 = 0.4, and β = 0.2. Three different values for the transactions cost are considered: τ = 0 (the base case with no transactions cost), τ = 0.05, and τ = 0.10. When τ = 0, the equilibrium is the one we discussed in Section 3. In this case L has an information advantage for all positive θ, and she never uses a mixed strategy, so ψ = 1 for all θ. If τ > 0, then L uses a mixed strategy when θ is sufficiently small. The top panel of Figure 3 shows that the equilibrium mixing probability ψ is an increasing function of θ. That is, the higher the probability of liquidity shock, the higher is the probability that (if she is not subject to a liquidity shock) L will sell when M takes the action. Intuitively, an increase in θ means that L does not need to refrain from trading on her information as much to create an information advantage sufficiently large to cover the transactions cost.
The bottom panel of Figure 3 shows L's disciplinary impact, i.e., the reduction in the agency cost brought about by L's presence. Note first that, as can be expected, L's impact is lower when ψ < 1. If θ is such that ψ = 1 (L sells whenever the action is taken), then her disciplinary impact is the same no matter what the exact level of the transactions cost. Second, while L's disciplinary impact is decreasing in the probability of a liquidity shock θ when she uses the pure strategy, this is not true over the range of θ for which L is using a mixed strategy. When the mixed strategy is used, L's disciplinary impact is actually increasing in θ. This is because when θ increases, L's information advantage increases and L trades more aggressively on her information, i.e., ψ is larger. This makes the difference between E s (x) and E ns (x) larger and ultimately increases the disciplinary impact that L's trading has. Thus, over the range where L is mixing, L's disciplinary impact is actually enhanced when θ is larger. Once θ is large enough that L sells with probability 1 when the action is taken, an increase in θ only has the effect of lowering the informativeness of a sale, which reduces L's disciplinary impact.
We now turn to a different type of exit cost, one that arises when L's continued presence is beneficial to the firm, due to any type of monitoring that L employs in later periods. We assume specifically that if L exits in period 1 for any reason, the value of the firm is reduced by π, independent of bothã andδ. (We assume that exit entails no other costs.) From L's immediate perspective, π is no different than the transactions cost τ , because it is a cost incurred in selling that must be factored into her trading decision. However, unlike the case of a transactions cost, the loss of π associated with L's exit affects the value of the firm to all investors and thus enters M 's compensation directly.
It is not intuitively clear whether L is more or less effective in disciplining M when her exit reduces the value of the firm. On the one hand, as in the case of the simple transactions cost, to the extent that the exit "punishment" will be used less frequently, this would generally tend to reduce L's disciplinary impact. However, when L does choose to exit, the negative effect this has on M 's compensation is larger when π is positive than when it is zero, which would generally tend to increase L's disciplinary impact. Below we examine the nature of the tradeoff between these two effects.
Consider Model B
a with an exit cost of π, and suppose that, absent a liquidity shock, L sells with probability ψ if M takes the action. In this case, if M takes the action forδ ≤ x, his expected utility whenδ = δ is
where E s (x) and E ns (x) are given in (24). If M does not take the action, his expected utility is
It follows that the equilibrium cutoff point x B must solve
This condition is quite similar to that obtained for Model B a in Section 3. The main difference is that the private benefit here is effectively lowered by (1 − θ)ψ(ω 1 + ω 2 )π. The reason is that the loss to the value of the firm that accompanies L's exit is felt directly by M . This works to alleviate the agency problem and potentially to enhance L's disciplinary impact.
An illustration of equilibria in the model where π > 0 is provided in Figure 4 . We assume again thatδ is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], β = 0.2, ω 1 = ω 2 = 0.4. Note that for relatively small values of π, the middle panel shows that ψ = 1, i.e., L sells with probability 1 if the action is taken. The range of π values where this is true is larger when θ is relatively large, because L's information advantage is increasing in θ. For this range we see in the top panel that the equilibrium cutoff point x B is decreasing as π increases, and this means that over this range L's disciplinary impact is greater the larger is the continuation value π. When π is large enough relative to θ so that L uses a mixed strategy in equilibrium, then L becomes less effective in disciplining M when π increases, and the cutoff point x B increases.
Note that the highest possible information advantage obtains when the equilibrium is nondisciplining, i.e., when x B = β/ω 2 = 0.5 (or, equivalently, when θ = 1), and this information advantage is equal to 0.125. The figure shows that the probability that L trades on her information vanishes when the continuation value π exceeds 0.125. For such large continuation values, exit is so costly that it is never done in equilibrium and thus the equilibrium becomes non-disciplining. Note also that if π is relatively low (below about 0.04), then L is more effective when θ = 0.1 than when θ = 0.5 (i.e., when the probability of a liquidity sale is higher), but the reverse is true when π is relatively large, as long as discipline is still possible, i.e., for π < 0.125. To see this, note that when π increases, L must at some point start mixing, which reduces her effectiveness. This occurs for lower values of π when θ is low because, other things equal, the information advantage increases in θ. Thus, for intermediate values of π, L's disciplinary impact is increasing in θ.
The bottom panel of Figure 4 plots L's "net impact," which is defined as the decrease in agency costs associated with the action (in period 1) minus the expected exit cost associated with L's informed trading in equilibrium, which is given by (1 − θ)ψPr(δ ≤ x B )π. If the net impact is positive, then shareholders are better off when L disciplines M through exit in period 1 even though exit leads to a reduction in the value of the firm. In this example L's net impact is always non-negative, and it is increasing in π over range where L is not mixing (and where x B is decreasing). For other distributions than the uniform, however, it can be shown that L's net impact can actually be negative. In those cases the loss of π that occurs when L exits is larger than the savings in agency cost brought about by the discipline she exerts in period 1.
In summary, we have seen that exit costs may not eliminate, and in some cases can even enhance, L's ability to discipline through exit. We have also seen that with exit costs, an increase in the probability of a liquidity shock θ can enhance L's disciplinary impact.
On Extensions with Additional Uncertainty
One of the assumptions made throughout our analysis is that β, the private benefit or cost, is constant and its value is common knowledge across all agents. If β is random and known only to M , then the inference ofãδ by L and the other investors is more complicated, because M 's decision clearly depends on the value of β and not just onδ. One special case that is covered by our analysis so far is one whereβ = γ 0 + γ 1δ with γ 0 > 0 and γ 1 < ω 2 . For example, consider Model B a and recall that whenδ = δ, M takes the action in Model B a when
Similarly, in Model G a the condition is
Conditions (29) and (30) are the same as those in Section 3 for the case of fixed β, with γ 0 playing the role of the "fixed" value of β of Section 3, and ω 2 − γ 1 playing the role of the coefficient ω 2 in Section 3. Since our analysis in Section 3 as well as in the rest of the paper relied on the assumption that ω 2 > 0, the analysis applies fully to the model withβ = γ 0 + γ 1δ if have γ 1 < ω 2 .
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18 If γ 1 > ω 2 , then some of our results would be "switched," because in Model B the manager will now take the action for all realizations ofδ above a cutoff, and in Model G he will take the action for realizations below a cutoff value. The general observations, however, e.g., that additional information may lead to lower disciplinary impact and that L's presence may exacerbate the agency problem, will not change.
We have also assumed implicitly throughout our analysis that the nature of the agency problem is common knowledge, i.e., that investors know whether Model B or Model G captures the situation at hand. We now consider the possibility that investors are uncertain about whether Model B or Model G is appropriate, i.e., whether they would like to encourage or discourage M to take the action. Specifically, assume that with probability α the agency problem is that of Model B, with a (known) private benefit denoted by β B a loss of value to the firm denoted byδ B , and with probability 1 − α the agency problem is described by Model G, with a (known) private benefit denoted by β B a loss of value to the firm denoted byδ B . Suppose that L can observe whether M has taken the action and that she also knows whether the action it is good or bad. However, as in the models of Section 3, no investor has information about the realization ofδ B orδ G . Then, under the maintained assumption that L can only exit or retain her shares, it can be shown that L can only provide discipline for one of the two types of agency problems, but not both.
To obtain some intuition, denote byã B the random variable indicating that M has taken a "bad" action (i.e., that the appropriate model is Model B and M has taken the action) andã G to be the random variable indicating that M has taken a "good" action. Define E s and E ns be the expectation ofã GδG −ã BδB conditional on L selling or not selling respectively. It is easy to see that if E s > 0 in equilibrium, then L will exit in all cases except when M takes a good action. This implies that L provides no discipline when the action is bad, since she exits whether the bad action is taken or not. Similarly, if the equilibrium value of E s is negative, then L will exit only when a bad action is taken. In this case L provides no discipline when the action is good, since she retains her shares no matter what M does.
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Interestingly, it can be shown that "model uncertainty" of the type discussed above can enhance the disciplinary impact of L in the following sense. Define x B (α) to the cutoff in the case where the agency problem is described by Model B as a function of the probability that this is the model, α. In the equilibria where E s < 0 and L provides discipline only for Model B, x B (α) can be increasing in α, especially for α near 1. The same can occur for x G (α). When E s > 0 and M provides discipline for Model G, x G (α) can be decreasing in α, especially for α near zero. Both of these effects occur because the possibility that the agency problem is of the other type can increase E s − E ns relative to the case where it is common knowledge what the agency problem is. 
Concluding Remarks
Our analysis suggests that the ability of large shareholders to vote with their feet and exit 19 It is possible that there are two equilibria, one in which E s > 0 and one in which E s < 0. 20 It should also be noted that the conclusion that L can only discipline in of the two agency problems is due to L having only two possible trades, namely exit or retain her shares. If L had a third possible trade, e.g., to increase her stake by buying more shares, then it would in principle be possible for her to provide discipline in both the Model B and Model G. A full examination of this is beyond the scope of this paper.
does not necessarily weaken corporate governance. If a manager cares about the market value of his firm, then the possibility that informed large shareholders can sell their shares and affect prices has the potential to reduce agency costs. However, we found that the extent to which the threat of exit can have a disciplinary impact depends on the nature of the agency problem as well as on the information structure. Potential exit in our model is generally useful in preventing managers from taking value-reducing actions, but not always in motivating them to take value-enhancing actions. Since it is the credible threat of exit that provides the discipline, we find that disciplinary gains can be realized even if actual exit occurs quite infrequently in equilibrium.
The large shareholder in our model, whom we refer to as L, was assumed to be endowed with her private information, but our analysis has immediate implications for the case where private information is costly. First note that L's ex ante expected trading profits in our model are zero -before she observes private information and before finding out whether she is subject to a liquidity shock, the expected profits L obtains when trading on private information are just offset by the expected losses she suffers when she is subject to a liquidity shock. Thus, the value of any private information acquired by L is only realized through the increase in the value of her initial share holdings brought about by her disciplinary impact. This implies that if information acquisition is costly, L would not acquire information in those cases where her trading is nondisciplining or dysfunctional, i.e., has no affect on the agency problem or exacerbates the agency problem. This means, in particular, that L will not acquire information about the consequences of a value-enhancing action.
While it is important to our results that L's trade has a price impact, it is not necessary that L sells her entire holdings in the firm. For some shareholders, such as very large public pension funds like CalPERs, complete exit may not be a viable option. Yet these shareholders have the potential to affect the price even if they sell a fraction of their holdings, and they certainly have incentives to gather information if they can increase the value of their holdings through a decrease in the agency costs. Note that index funds, compensated for tracking a pre-specified index, have no incentives to gather information for any purpose, and no incentives to otherwise monitor portfolio firms.
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In our model L's trade has an immediate and direct effect on the price and M's compensation depends on the price at which L trades. Suppose instead that L trades anonymously in a noisy market, i.e., one that includes other traders potentially subject to liquidity shocks. Then two seemingly conflicting effects emerge. First, when L trades anonymously in a noisy market, the direct impact of her trade on the price is generally lower than when the price is based on L's trade alone. Other things equal, this would seem to reduce L's ability to discipline M , since her trade would have less impact on the price and on M 's compensation. Second, when L trades anonymously, her information advantage is larger and, in fact, her ex ante expected trading profits are positive. In general, this would increase L's willingness to gather information and trade on it, which can potentially increase her disciplinary impact.
It is interesting to note that in this noisy market situation, a variation on our model can actually provide a role for trade disclosure that enables information-based trade to have a disciplinary impact. Suppose L trades in a noisy market and that M's compensation is sensitive to prices beyond the price at which L trades, but before all her information becomes public. If L's trade, and possibly also the motive for her trade, becomes public after the trade takes place, e.g., as a result of trade disclosure, then there will be further price impact at the time when information about L's trade becomes public. This in turn would affect M 's compensation, which, in equilibrium, may affect M's decisions. Since trading in a noisy market increases L's trading profits, it would lead to additional information acquisition, which would generally enhance L's disciplinary impact. Thus, the disciplinary impact of exit would be enhanced by trade disclosure. To see this suppose, for example, that M 's short-term compensation is based on the price prevailing at the end of the calendar year. Suppose L exits anonymously in October, and then in November it becomes known or is disclosed that she has exited. Then the price in December would fully reflect the fact that L has exited and this would affect M's compensation. At the same time, L is able to benefit from her information advantage by trading in October, potentially allowing her to recover the cost of information and any transactions costs.
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Our model is consistent with a number of activities that large shareholders are known to engage in at times, which may be more common than many overt forms of shareholder activism. These include the 'targeting' of firms and various forms of behind-the-scene communication and negotiation between large shareholders and managers, often referred to as 'jawboning.' Such activities have been reported to be successful in affecting managerial decisions, for example, in Carleton, Nelson and Weisbach (1998) . Note that in our model there is no need for the manager and the large shareholder to communicate. However, the model implicitly assumes that the manager is aware of the presence of the large shareholder and understands the price impact of the large shareholder's trade, which means that he knows what type of information the large shareholder has. If the manager is not fully aware of the large shareholder's presence or the type of information she possesses, then achieving the disciplinary impact may require that the large shareholder communicate with the manager prior to the "onset" of our model. The threat to exit that may be implicit or explicit when the large shareholder communicates with the manager is indeed likely to be more credible than threats to engage in proxy fights or to submit shareholder proposals, both of which are costly and often unlikely to succeed.
Finally note that in our model disciplinary impact through the threat of exit is only effective if the large shareholder has some information about the manager's action. If the action is not publicly observable, then our model predicts that the large shareholder would have incentives to gather private information about the action. We have also shown that if the manager's actions are publicly observable, the threat of exit has a potential disciplinary impact only when the agency problem is of the "bad action" type, but not if it involves a "good action." Thus, our model predicts that in the case of acquisitions and other publicly observable managerial actions, the disciplinary role of a large shareholder's exit will be evident in cash-rich firms prone to the "free cash flow" agency problems. More generally, to the extent that it is possible to identify situations where specific agency problems and information structures are likely to emerge, our model can be used to examine existing evidence and to provide additional predictions regarding the potential role of informed trading in corporate governance.
The equilibrium will be unique if
The first part of the product on the right hand size of (A2), namely B(x)/(1 − C(x)), is equal to E(δ | δ ≤ x) which is nondecreasing in x. The second part is nondecreasing in x since C (x) ≤ 0 and 0 < θ < 1. It is easy to see that x B < β/ω 2 , which means that the equilibrium must be disciplining.
Now consider Model G a . If x G <δ is an equilibrium cutoff, then
where
In this case the equilibrium will be unique if
The first part of the product on the right hand side of (A5), namely A(x)/C(x), is equal to E(δ |δ ≥ x), which is nondecreasing in x. The second part is the same as the second part in (A2) and is nondecreasing in x. To show that x G < x B whenever x B <δ, it is sufficient to show that for all x in the support ofδ,
This follows immediately since A(x)/C(x) = E(δ |δ ≥ x), which is clearly greater than
Proof of Proposition 2: Let p be the probability that M takes the action and let e be the expectation ofδ conditional on M taking the action. Consider first Model B a . Since E B ns = 0, the equilibrium condition for a disciplining equilibrium is β −ω 1 E
If we let c = β/ω 1 , the equilibrium condition becomes (1 − θ)pe/ (θ + (1 − θ)p) = c or p(e − c) = θc/(1 − θ). Thus any strategy for M that results in a p and an e satisfying this relation is an equilibrium. In general there are many equilibria since there are many strategies for M that lead to p's and e's that satisfy the equilibrium condition. It will be useful to write the equilibrium condition in two ways:
.
From the equilibrium condition given in (A7) we can conclude that pe, i.e., the expected loss in Model B a , is increasing in p, the probability that M takes the action, since c is fixed and positive. From the equilibrium condition given in (A8), we can conclude p is decreasing in e, the expectation ofδ given that M takes the action. Thus the expected loss is the lowest in that equilibrium that has the highest e.
Now consider Model G a . The equilibrium condition for a disciplining equilibrium is −β + p) ) and E G ns = e. Again, letting c = β/ω 1 , we find that the equilibrium condition is (1 − p)(e − c) = θc/(1 − θ), or
Once again any strategy for M that results in a p and an e satisfying this relation is an equilibrium. Now in model G a we want to maximize pe, which is the expected gain. It is clear from (A9) that p is increasing in e, which means that to maximize pe we want the equilibrium that has the highest e. Thus, in both Model B a and Model G a the best equilibrium is the one with the highest e.
We now show that for both Model B a and Model G a the best disciplining equilibrium (when such an equilibrium exists) is achieved when M follows an "upper" strategy, i.e., one in which 
Note that δ x (δ − c) dF (δ) is maximized at x = c and is decreasing for all x > c. Moreover the maximum attained at x = c is the maximum attained across all strategies. Thus if a disciplining equilibrium exists, there exists an x
• > c such that
Moreover, this upper strategy equilibrium will have the highest expectation ofδ conditional on M taking the action, i.e. the highest e, and is therefore the best. (Note that there cannot be another upper strategy equilibrium with an x greater than x • since δ x (δ − c) dF (δ) is decreasing in x for x > c.) Now consider Model G a . The equilibrium condition is (1 − p)(e − c) = θc/(1 − θ).
Assume that M follows an upper strategy equilibrium in which he takes the action if and only if δ > x and let p(x) and e(x) be the values of p and e for this equilibrium as functions of x. Let x c be such that e(x c ) = c. Such an x will exist and is unique as long as c ≤δ. (If c >δ there is no disciplining equilibrium.) Now (1 − p(x))(e(x) − c) is increasing in x for all x > x c and it attains its maximum (δ − c) as x approachesδ. Moreover, this maximum is the maximum across all strategies M might follow. This means that if there is a disciplining equilibrium, then there is a unique x • > x c such that (1 − p(x • ))(e(x • ) − c) = θc/(1 − θ). Since e(x • ) is the highest e possible, this is the optimal strategy in Model G a .
Proof of Proposition 3:
Let g(x) = β − (1 − θ)ω 1 E s (x) − E ns (x) − ω 2 x, where E s (x) and E s (x) are defined by (11) and (12). Since we assume thatδ is continuously distributed, it follows that E s (x) and E ns (x) are continuous functions of x. Moreover for all x > 0, E s (x)−E ns (x) > 0. Since g(0) > 0 and g(β/ω 2 ) < 0, there must be at least one x B ∈ (0, β/ω 2 ) such that g(x B ) = 0 and this is an equilibrium cutoff for Model B a,δ . For any given value of x, E s (x) solves
δ − E s (x) dF(δ) = 0.
As θ → 0, it is clear that E s (x) → x. Since L sells on the interval [E s (x), x], the probability of L selling vanishes as θ → 0.
Proof of Proposition 4: Let x = β/w 2 <δ, x 1 (θ) be the highest type manager that takes the action in Model B a for a given θ, and x 2 (θ) be the same for Model B a,δ . We want to show that for θ sufficiently close to 1, the gain produced by L in Model B a is greater than that produced in Model B a,δ . The gain is related to the size of the interval ofδ realizations that refrain from taking the action due to L's presence. For Model B a this is
x − x 1 (θ) = β w 2 − β − (1 − θ)w 1 Q(x 1 (θ), θ) w 2 = (1 − θ)w 1 Q(x 1 (θ), θ) w 2 ,
where Q(x 1 (θ), θ) =
Note that
For Model B a,δ this is
where R(x 2 (θ), θ) = θ x 2 (θ) 0 δ dF(δ) + (1 − θ)
and where y(θ) solves y(θ) = θ 
where y = x 0 δ dF(δ) . We now take the limit of (x − x 1 (θ))/(x − x 2 (θ)) as θ → 1. This is lim θ→1
x − x 1 (θ) x − x 2 (θ) = lim θ→1 Q(x 1 (θ), θ) R(x 2 (θ), θ) = 
which is strictly grater than 1 since y > 0. This means that for θ sufficiently close to 1, the cutoff below which the action is taken in Model B a is strictly smaller than that in Model B a,δ .
Proof of Proposition 5:
If there are two equilibria to Model G a,δ , one must be the equilibrium of Model G a and the other must be non-disciplining. Let x be the cutoff in the equilibrium of Model G a and let z be the cutoff in the non-disciplining equilibrium, i.e., β/ω2. Then, for the equilibrium of Model G a to be an equilibrium of Model G a,δ we must have
while equilibrium cutoffs for Model B a and Model B a,δ solve respectively:
and β − w 2 x = (1 − θ) (w 1 Q c (x) − E ns (x)) .
If Q a (x) is at least as large as Q b (x) and Q c (x), then there is an equilibrium cutoff solving (A29) that is no greater than any solving (A30) and (A31). Moreover, if Q a (x) is strictly larger than Q b (x) and Q c (x) (which will generally be the case), then there is an equilibrium cutoff solving (A29) that is strictly less than any solving (A30) and (A31).
We will first show that Q a (x) ≥ Q b (x) for all x. Define Π is the same as the sign of
The first term in (A32) is clearly nonnegative. Consider now the last term. Observe that
Now since x ≥ Q a ≥ 0 we have
This means that the last expression in (A32) is nonnegative (and strictly positive if x > Q a > 0).
It is easy to see that the non-negativity of the last expression in (A32) implies that the second expression in (A32) is also nonnegative. This is because ∆ Using the definition of Q a (x), one can easily see that
when θ > θ x 0 dF(δ) . To show that Q a (x) ≥ Q c (x) it is sufficient to show that there is a unique solution to (A35) and that the left hand side of (A35) is increasing in y at the solution. Let S(y) be the left hand side of (A35). It is straightforward to show that
One can see from (A37) that S(y) is increasing for at all values of y that solve (A35). Since S(y) is continuous, this means that there is a unique y that solves (A35). From this and (A36) it follows that Q a (x) ≥ Q c (x).
Proof of Proposition 7:
First we prove that an equilibrium exists and is unique. To do this we first show that for all x in the support of the distribution ofδ, there is a unique E s (x) that solves the defining equation given by (19) in Section 5, and that E s (x) is increasing in x. From (19) we see that E s (x) is any value of y that solves
or, equivalently, which solves S(y) = θ It is easy to see that S(x) < 0, S(δ) > 0, and S (y) > 0 for all y ∈ (x,δ). This means that there is a unique y > x that solves (A39). Now consider Model G a,δ , and denote by m G (δ) be the probability that M takes the action for a given δ. In this case in any equilibrium L will retain her shares when M takes the action (unless she is subject to a liquidity shock) and sell if M does not take the action. This means that whenδ = δ we have
It follows that in Model G a,δ δ M is indifferent between taking the action and not taking it if and only if −β + ω 1 θE s (δ) + (1 − θ)E ns (δ) + ω 2 δ = ω 1 E s (δ),
or,
Note that (A45) defines the function m B (δ) over the range of δ for which m B (δ) ∈ (0, 1) and (A48) does the same for m G (δ).
